Monday, June 15, 2009

Iran into a Little Trouble Over the Weekend

I suppose I should say something about the Iranian elections. Although there really isn't a great deal to say, as most bloggers and pundits seem to waver between sky-is-falling speculation and suggestions for somehow putting things right.

In order to even have the conversation, you need at the very outset to define who it is you are speaking for, and about. If you want to discuss the implications of the election and it's dubious outcome for American policy and in light of American interests, that's going to be a very different conversation than a discussion of the impact of the election on the Iranian people and regional geopolitics. Neither of which is as fascinating as a completely speculative discussion of not just what actually happened, but why.

But first, we need to try to decide what, at this point, we believe actually occurred. There are three possible narratives.

First, and least likely, the possibility must be considered that something unexpected happened and Mahmoud Ahmedinejad actually did win this election fair and square. There are no reliable polls in Iran, and Ahmedinejad's base of support is rural, so one must consider the possibility that the outcome was exactly as it should have been. However, enough experts have debunked this possibility, not to even mention what simple common sense tells us about the differential and how it was announced. If he had "won" by a much more scant margin, or even had to wait and "win" the runoff, there would have been fewer questions asked. But it appears that in their arrogance, the powerful people ruling Iran did not consider the popular reaction.

If we do not accept that possibility, the next likeliest scenario is that Ahmedinejad had become part of the powerful elites in government and the Revolutionary Guards and they set out to manipulate the election results on their own, outside of the purview and capacity of the clerical leadership. This is somewhat unlikely because of the absolute power the Ayatollahs wield, but if it happened it would be the scariest outcome, because then power would be vested in the hands of a dictatorial few who's agenda we cannot know.

The most likely explanation for what we saw in Iran over the last few days is that the clerical leadership had some deep reservations about Moussavi's ascent to power, and at the last minute decided to make certain that Ahmedinejad kept the Presidency. This seems to be the scenario that most people favor, and based on what we've been able to observe it is the description of events that most neatly fits observed reality, but it has one gaping flaw. Why? The Ayatollahs have the power, and they have kept that power when reformist politicians held presidential office before, in much more challenging times when Saddam was a real threat on their border. What could have caused them to decide it was necessary to risk the social turmoil, or even the possibility of a real change in government that this blatant action might lead to?

Until we can understand what it was about a Moussavi Presidency that was categorically unacceptable to the Mullahs we cannot really understand what transpired there. So we move on to the next question, the one that Americans always ask because EVERY global event is ultimately about us, is it not? What should we do? And of course, wisdom would cause the American leadership to recognize the limitations on any American reaction. Almost ANYTHING we can do would be counterproductive in light of America's unfortunate history meddling in Iranian internal politics for the last sixty years.

The US can register it's concern over the election, and can certainly support any internal Iranian calls for internal or international investigations. Beyond that, America cannot do anything helpful to the Iranian people or their nascent democracy movement. And there has been so much debate about diplomatic engagement with Iran over the last few years, certainly there will be calls for an end to the American diplomatic outreach to the Iranians that has only barely started. But for what? What can possibly be gained by further isolating the Iranian leadership.

The reason a nation engages diplomatically with other nations is to pursue HER interests, not the interests of the other nations. American interests haven't changed, and the only way America can pursue those interests is to engage with the leadership, no matter who they are, or how they came to power. If America is willing to share diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia or China, we cannot honestly claim to be squeamish about dealing with a non-democratically elected leader in Iran, can we?

2 Comments:

At 1:19 PM, Anonymous Willy said...

Part of the rhetoric of revolt is once the revolution has been achieved (I'm talking about 1979) the regime goes into a phase of defending themselves from outsiders. This can be a real outsider threat or it can be a threat that is manufactured. Either work to assure that the revolution continues, vigilant against backsliding and that power remains in the hands of the revolutionaries. Mousavi most likely represented an easing of the revolutionary stance and thus could not be countenanced. The revolution cannot be sustained if there are no enemies, real or imagined.

I'm just trying to apply explanations offered by PD Brandes' book, The Rhetoric of Revolt. Good book.

 
At 4:04 PM, Anonymous ckc (not kc) said...

...I fear the Iranians will have no need to manufacture outsider threats.

 

Post a Comment

<< Home